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INTRODUCTION
Rape is the most severe sexual offense, involving one of the most
feared and reviled acts a person can inflict on another. But what are
the normative foundations of rape? Initially, the doctrine of rape was
limited to penial-vaginal forceful penetration.1 Over time, other
forceful kinds of penetrations have been added: oral, anal, and later,
the forceful insertion of inanimate objects.2 The requirement of
using force lost its exclusiveness and much of its normative power,
paving the way to other kinds of rape: sex by non-forceful coercion,
sex by sedation, sex with mentally incompetent people, sex by fraud,
and other forms of non-consensual problematic sex.3 The normative
debate about each form is ongoing and, in a manner of speaking, rape
has become a limitless notion.4 Where will the rape offense go next?
Cyberspace, apparently.5
The Israeli Supreme Court has recently affirmed convictions of
rape by distant communication.6 The perpetrators conversed with
children, teenagers, and adult women online, using fraud and
blackmail to manipulate them into self-penetration.7 This
groundbreaking judicial development is the inspiration behind the
normative analysis offered in this Article, revolving around Western
notions of rape.8 Should such ill-intended communications constitute
rape? Is the word “rape” suitable to describe virtual scenarios and



1.

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ph.D., Haifa University; Senior Lecturer, Zefat Academic College; teaching and
researching criminal law and cybercrime for twelve years; formerly a prosecutor and a
defender. I wish to thank my research assistant Liat Marks for her help, my friend
Yehuda Levi for his editorial notes, and the editors for their thorough notes on the
road to improve this Article.
Joanne Conaghan, The Essence of Rape, 39 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 153 (2019).
The traditional legal terminology used was “carnal knowledge,” which is defined as
the entry of the male sexual organ into the female sexual organ. See 3 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 278 (15th ed. 2020).
See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 154; see CAROL E. TRACY ET AL., RAPE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 4 (2012), http://www.womenslawproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/Rape-and-Sexual-Assault-in-the-Legal-System-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RZ5G-2FZ7].
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-304(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2021
Reg. Sess. General Assem.) (showing addition of non-forceful means of rape in
Maryland’s rape statute).
See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 155 (illustrating both sides of the debate surrounding
the expansion of the definition of rape).
See infra Section II.B.
See infra notes 76–105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 76–105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
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online communications involving sexual exploitation? Although it is
tempting to intuitively say no, the normative road to the proper legal
answer is more complicated than it may seem.9
This Article systematically scrutinizes the normative cyber rape
thesis on Anglo-American doctrines of rape.10 It analytically divides
the normative conception of rape into three facets and examines each
separately: the physics of the offensive scenario;11 the settings of the
physical scenario and the manner in which sexual autonomy is
violated;12 and finally, the matter of proper criminal labeling.13 This
Article shows that sexual autonomy is under substantial attack in
cyberspace and that connecting this attack to different doctrines of
rape is not such a farfetched notion.14 Nevertheless, a systematic
analysis reveals normative gaps between offline and online
harmfulness and wrongfulness,15 as well as normative gaps between
different doctrines of rape.16 All in all, the framework of rape is
unsuitable to handle these cyber-attacks.17 This does not suggest we
should tolerate offensive online conduct, but rather that new and
specific prohibitions are better suited to protect sexual autonomy
online.18
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I reviews the offense of
rape.19 It first describes the historical central developments and
expansions of the offense, discussing various prominent legal
constructs of rape.20 It then explores the Israeli precedent applying
the rape offense to technological means.21

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Section II.G (describing the reasoning behind labeling instances of virtual
communications as “rape”).
See infra Part II.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Sections II.C–.F.
See infra Section II.G.
See infra Sections II.D–.F (showing how the doctrines of coercion, deception, and
incompetence apply in a cyber context).
See infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information
Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 586 (1998) (listing three
reasons it is difficult for existing legal frameworks to apply to changing technologies).
See infra text accompanying notes 275–76, 285–301, 323–33. See generally infra
Sections II.C–.G.
See infra Part I.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
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Part II extensively analyzes the cyber rape thesis within the
framework of Anglo-American doctrines of rape.22 After reviewing
the rapidly growing technological developments in communication in
the age of cyberspace, it normatively scrutinizes the thesis by
analytically dividing the normative notion of rape into three facets
and examining each separately.23
Eventually this Article concludes that sexual autonomy is indeed
under attack in cyberspace by use of other forms of technology and
communication, and that there are significant normative similarities
in the ways sexual autonomy is attacked offline and online.24
However, applying the framework of rape to this technology seems
disproportional, unfair, and distorts public messages about the
harmfulness and dangerousness of the perpetrators who commit this
offense. Cyber sexual offensiveness should not be tolerated, but new
legal frameworks are more suitable to address it.25
I.

REVIEWING THE LAW OF RAPE

A. History, Rationales, and Legal Constructs
While much of humanity has changed for the better, some of its
shameful facets seem constant. The act of rape has always been a
part of human conduct around the globe.26 The criminalization of
rape is also far from new.27 Old regimes criminalized rape to protect
the honor of women’s’ fathers, husbands, and brothers;28 thus, it

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Sections II.B–.G.
See infra Conclusion.
See infra text accompanying notes 311–33.
See Megan Lutz-Priefert, Note, A Call for a More Permanent International Definition
of Rape, 6 CREIGHTON INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 85, 86 (2015) (reviewing the
omnipresence of rape throughout time, culture, gender, and race); see Katharine K.
Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 221, 225–27
(2015); see Elizabeth Hanus, Comment, Rape by Nonphysical Coercion: State v.
Brooks, 64 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2016); see also Alena Allen, Rape
Messaging, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2018) (noting that rape has existed
since the earliest civilizations).
Hanus, supra note 26, at 1143; Allen, supra note 26, at 1034.
See Ben A. McJunkin, Deconstructing Rape by Fraud, 28 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,
36–38 (2014); see Margo Kaplan, Rape Beyond Crime, 66 DUKE L.J. 1045, 1055
(2017); see Kari Hong, A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less
Punishment, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259, 274 (2018); see Michael Mullen, Note, Rape
by Fraud: Eluding Washington Rape Statutes, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1035, 1046
(2018); see also STUART P. GREEN, CRIMINALIZING SEX: A UNIFIED LIBERAL THEORY
57 (2020) (describing the ancient justification of the offense).
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follows the rape offense overlooked marital coercion.29
Unfortunately, in modern times, the rape phenomenon is still far from
being obsolete or even uncommon.30
While sexual offensiveness appears to be an ill-fated constant in
human life, the offense of rape has undergone major changes
throughout the years.31 The general paradigm of rape, revolving
around coercive sex, has clearly expanded throughout the years.32
At the end of the nineteenth century, American rape law leaned on
the paradigm of the stranger rapist, lurking in the shadows, prepared
to attack virtuous women.33 Enforcement focused on AfricanAmerican males while knowingly overlooking white male
perpetrators.34 The law required victims to fight to their death.35
Sexist norms were woven into the rape law, which in turn enforced
those norms.36 Late in the twentieth century, women’s rights
movements succeeded in achieving major reforms in rape law,
perceiving rape as a crime of violence and control.37 The physical
element of rape as a legal construct has expanded.38 The FBI
formerly defined rape as “the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly

29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.

See Melanie Randall & Vasanthi Venkatesh, The Right to No: The Crime of Marital
Rape, Women’s Human Rights, and International Law, 41 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 153,
154–55 (2015); see Stacy-Ann Elvy, A Postcolonial Theory of Spousal Rape: The
Caribbean and Beyond, 22 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 89, 92 (2015); see also Patricia J.
Falk, Husbands Who Drug and Rape Their Wives: The Injustice of the Marital
Exemption in Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 36 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 265, 275–76 (2015)
(analyzing marital rape in modern times).
See Lutz-Priefert, supra note 26, at 86–87 (discussing rape statistics).
McJunkin, supra note 28, at 6–7; Graceann Carimico et al., Rape and Sexual Assualt,
17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 359, 360 (2016); Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law
Gatekeeping, 58 B.C. L. REV. 206, 211–13 (2017); Leslie Berkseth et al., Review
Article, Rape and Sexual Assault, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 743, 747 (2017) (noting
that state legislatures have thoroughly changed the substantive criminal laws
regarding rape during previous decades).
Hanus, supra note 26, at 1143–44.
Allen, supra note 26, at 1052–53; Randall & Venkatesh, supra note 29, at 158.
See Yung, supra note 31, at 229–30.
See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
See id. at 1093, 1095.
See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: HOW THE LEGAL SYSTEM VICTIMIZES WOMEN WHO
SAY NO 4 (1987) (methodically criticizing former laws of rape and suggesting
application of rape law for each instance of non-consent); see Estrich, supra note 35,
at 1087, 1095, 1121–22, 1127, 1132.
An Updated Definition of Rape, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.justi
ce.gov/archives/opa/blog/updated-definition-rape [https://perma.cc/D2EZ-M7H5].
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and against her will[,]” meaning sexual intercourse.39 Today we see
a broader definition by the FBI and DOJ: “penetration, no matter how
slight, of the vagina or anus with body part or object, or oral
penetration by a sex organ of another person, without the consent of
the victim.”40
This change is not only about expanding the offense beyond the
traditional intercourse, but also about perceiving males as potential
victims.41 Rape was previously a gender-specific crime—only men
were the perpetrators, and only women their victims.42 As the crime
started including male victims, that also changed by expanding the
physiological concept of rape.43 Evidently, coercion does not
necessarily have to rely on force.44 While many states still include
this element, there is a wide academic consensus that doing so is
normatively obsolete.45
The modern conception of rape connects the offense with the need
to protect the sexual autonomy of any gender.46 Personal autonomy
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.
45.

46.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 55–56, 67 (2nd ed. 2002)
(writing that until 1994 rape was the most prominent gender-based offense). But see
Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345 (Isr.) (defining rape victims as only women under
Israeli law).
TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 68–69.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335, 336–37
(2017).
Hanus, supra note 26, at 1146–48; Hong, supra note 28, at 274–79 (noting that most
U.S. states still require force as an element of rape; arguing to discard force as a vital
element); see Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 342–43, 347 (suggesting a change in the
meaning of force to include all types of coercion).
See Stuart P. Green, Lies, Rape, and Statutory Rape, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION
AND TRUTH-TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 194, 206 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2015); see Hanus, supra note 26, at 1144; see also McJunkin, supra note 28, at 7
(noting that the modern normative basis of the rape offense is widely understood as a
violation of sexual autonomy). But see Luis E. Chiesa, Solving the Riddle of Rape-byDeception, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 407, 429–30 (2017) (suggesting that the law of
rape is meant to protect freedom, rather than autonomy); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 436 (2016) (claiming rape is a crime
of gender inequality); McJunkin, supra note 28, at 43–46 (calling for
acknowledgement of human dignity as the normative basis of the rape offense); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122
YALE L.J. 1372, 1378–80 (2013) (arguing this rationale is incoherent due to the lack
of substantive criminalization of sex by fraud). See generally Joseph J. Fischel &
Hilary R. O’Connell, Disabling Consent, or Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 428 (2015) (dismissing criticism and supporting sexual
autonomy as the rationale of sex crimes).

2021]

Cyber Rape: Online Violations of Sexual Autonomy

363

is about the ability to control, choose, and decide one’s lifestyle.47 It
is about self-governance and the capacity to reflect and revise one’s
identity and values.48 All of the above may be considered necessary
to personhood.49 Personal autonomy is extremely valued in modern
times.50
Personal autonomy can be broken down into specific layers, one of
which regards sex.51 Sexual autonomy can be perceived broadly to
include the right to choose sexual activities, sexual partners, places,
timing, and additional circumstances.52
Various actions may
implicate positive and negative dimensions of sexual autonomy.53
Alongside the paradigm of coercive rape, there are other
paradigms, unique in the sense they do not exclude scenarios in
which victims consent to intercourse, treating that consent as legally
defective.54
One of them is quite common in American
55
jurisdictions. Having sex with minors is forbidden even with their
consent, sometimes between two consenting minors, which is known

47.

48.

49.
50.

51.
52.
53.

54.
55.

See 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 28,
115 (1986); see Meir Dan-Cohen, Basic Values and the Victim’s State of Mind, 88
CAL. L. REV. 759, 765 (2000) (explaining the notion of personal autonomy); see Joel
Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 446–47, 453–54 (1983).
See Chiesa, supra note 46, at 420 (stating there is no universal definition of
autonomy, but the central understanding is that autonomy is about capability of “selfrule”).
See McJunkin, supra note 28, at 8 (connecting autonomy with personhood, which is
required for flourishing).
Daniel Susser et al., Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 35 (2019) (stressing that autonomy lies at the normative core of
liberal democracies).
See Green, supra note 46, at 206–08 (comparing personal autonomy to property law,
in the sense that personal autonomy is made of a bundle of rights).
See id. at 208 (illustrating sexual autonomy).
Id. at 207; Hanus, supra note 26, at 1144 (stressing that sexual autonomy has a
negative dimension—freedom from unwanted sex—and a positive dimension—
freedom to pursue sexual relationships that are mutually desired); see Chiesa, supra
note 46, at 421, 432–33 (distinguishing “autonomy,” the capacity for selfdetermination in accordance with one’s authentic or true values, from freedom, which
is the ability to act without significant external constraints).
See infra text accompanying notes 55–62.
See Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, #MeToo, Statutory Rape Laws, and the Persistence of
Gender Stereotypes, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 117, 119 (“All states and the federal
government have enacted a collection of crimes aimed at punishing sex between two
persons when at least one is under the age of consent.”).
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as “statutory rape.”56 This niche reflects the concept of the
incompetent victim.57
The second paradigm, while being wide in theory, is relatively
narrow in practice. It is comprised of situations in which the victim
agreed to an act without comprehending it as sexual, or agreed to
have intercourse with the perpetrator who had disguised himself as
the victim’s spouse—i.e., “rape by fraud.”58 This niche reflects the
uninformed victim.
There are also other forms of rape. Rape by sedation is typically
devoid of any consent by the victim.59 Self-intoxication is more
complex, at least in cases in which a person can still speak and move;
one might suggest intoxication does not allow meaningful consent,
but nevertheless, some consent is possible.60 However, sedation is
not relevant in cyber contexts, for the time being, and there is no
technology to sedate another online user from afar.61 On the other
hand, coercion, incompetence, and fraud are all present online,62 and
their rape doctrines may be adapted for the electronic world. In one
country, that has already happened.63

56.

57.
58.
59.

60.

61.

62.
63.

See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 404 (1984); see Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life:
Statutory Rape, Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence
Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205, 1226, 1240 (1998); see Daryl J. Olszewski,
Comment, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for Reform,
89 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2006); see Anna High, Good, Bad and Wrongful
Juvenile Sex: Rethinking the Use of Statutory Rape Laws Against the Protected Class,
69 ARK. L. REV. 787, 791–836 (2016); see also Asaf Harduf, Statutory (Is Not) Rape:
Reshaping the Criminalization of Underage Sex, and Beyond, 56 CRIM. L. BULL. 871,
871 (2020) (reviewing and criticizing laws of statutory rape).
See Harduf, supra note 56, at 901.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at 1395–1402 (discussing laws regarding rape by
fraud).
See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2002) (discussing cases of drug rape; reviewing
American legislation and calling for a legal reform).
See Hong, supra note 28, at 289–90 (claiming that intoxicated people lack the ability
to meaningfully distinguish wanted sex from unwanted sex, and that the crime of rape
by intoxication is underinclusive).
See generally Nora Fitzgerald & K. Jack Riley, Drug-Facilitated Rape: Looking for
the Missing Pieces, NAT’L INST. JUST. J., Apr. 2000, at 8, 13 (“Drug-facilitated rape
may be initiated in social settings, like parties and clubs, not traditionally considered
high-risk environments.”).
See infra Sections II.D–.F.
See infra text accompanying notes 64–112.
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B. Rape Meets Technology: The Israeli Precedent
The general expansions of the rape offense and its legal
construct—e.g., the direct use of force to overpower the will of
another, other ways of coercion, and the inclusion of underage and
fraudulent sex—have brought an astonishing judicial expansion to
the concept of rape in Israel: “rape by communication.”64
Prior to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel
in 1948—a few years after the Holocaust—Britain had governed
Palestine for many years and established a local common law system
without juries.65 The Penal Code in Israel was similar to codes the
British used for other colonies and territories.66 At the birth of its
independent legal framework, Israel adopted most mandatory laws
enacted by the British.67 While the Israeli legal system is based in
common law, it also includes aspects of civil law.68 Throughout its
first decades, the Israeli judicial system was significantly influenced
by British law and looked at British precedents to resolve legal
debates.69 In time, the Israeli courts gained confidence and no longer
needed to rely on foreign rulings to resolve cases.70 However, many
of the laws set by the British sovereignty are still in effect even
today,71 as are a few of the Ottoman regime laws which preceded the
British rule.72
Israel’s rape offense is defined in section 345 of its Penal Code,
1977, and includes five equal alternative forms of non-aggravated
rape: (1) intercourse with a woman without her freely given consent;

64.
65.
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

72.

See infra text accompanying notes 73–112.
Steven J. Colby, Note, A Jury for Israel?: Determining When a Lay Jury System Is
Ideal in a Heterogeneous Country, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 121, 126–27 (2014).
See Shlomo Guberman, Development of the Law in Israel- The First 50 Years, ISR.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFS. (June 19, 2000), https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/israel
at50/pages/development%20of%20the%20law%20in%20israel-%20the%20first%205
/0%20yea.aspx [https://perma.cc/WH96-N8SL].
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the Transplantation of British
Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 561, 564–68,
582–87 (2009).
See, e.g., George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 493–94 (1994); Natalie Orpett, The Archaeology
of Land Law: Excavating Law in the West Bank, 40 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 344, 389
(2012).
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(2) intercourse with a woman with her consent, obtained by deceit
with respect to the identity of the person or the nature of the act; (3)
intercourse with a woman below the age of fourteen, even with her
consent; (4) intercourse with a woman by exploiting her state of
unconsciousness or other condition that prevents her from giving her
free consent; and (5) intercourse with a woman by exploiting the fact
that she is mentally ill or deficient.73 Intercourse is defined as
“introduc[ing] any part of the body or any object into the woman’s
sex organ.”74 Following the gender-specific history of the offense,
rape is still only defined as an offense against women under Israeli
law.75
At the end of 2011, for the first time in Israel and perhaps in human
history, the prosecution indicted a person for “facilitating rape” in
what can be defined as “verbal rape” or “communicative rape.”76 A
sixty-nine-year-old male was accused of causing rape, after he had
phoned a minor, presented himself as a physician and instructed her
to penetrate herself.77 That same week, the prosecution indicted a
fifty-year-old man for rape, after posing online as a teenage boy,
causing a minor to penetrate herself.78 Eventually the charges were
dropped, and the defendant pled guilty to aggravated indecent acts.79
To date, the new intriguing paradigm of communicative rape has
received critical judicial attention only in two short decisions. In
2012, an IDF twenty-nine-year-old male soldier was indicted for
maliciously causing rape.80 He falsely presented online as a

73.
74.
75.

76.

77.
78.
79.
80.

Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 345(a) (Isr.).
§ 345(c).
Id.; see also TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 55–56, 67–69 (noting that, until 1994, rape
was the most prominent gender-based offense, as it was only considered penile
penetration of a vagina).
See CrimA 34264-12-11 Israel vs. Melamed (Dec. 18, 2011) (Isr.) (on file with
author). It appears that the prosecution and the defense reached an agreement; besides
the indictment, there is no trace of this case. See id. The remainder of Section I.B.
discusses several Israeli criminal cases that signify the early recognition of cyber rape
as a punishable offense. The following Israeli judicial opinions and court filings are
published and readily available solely in Hebrew. All referenced authorities are on
file with the Author, and his interpretation and analysis are contained in the
subsequent discussion.
Id.
See Case (DC CT) 40230-12-11 State of Israel v. Sabach (Dec. 21, 2011) (Isr.) (on
file with author).
See CrimA 538/13 Sabach v. State of Israel (Dec. 26, 2013) (Isr.) (on file with
author).
Case (DC Hi) 1520/12 State of Israel v. Danino (May 7, 2012) (Isr.) (on file with
author).
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nineteen-year-old female soldier, pushing teenage girls to penetrate
themselves, sometimes by blackmail.81 At the bail hearing, the
District Judge briefly endorsed the possibility of a new legal
paradigm of rape, but nonetheless suggested it seemed somewhat
disproportionate regarding the level of punishment for such actions.82
The prosecution took the hint and later dropped the rape charges; the
defendant pled guilty to aggravated indecent acts and was sentenced
to two years imprisonment.83
The last time this paradigm received any critical judicial attention
was in 2015.84 At a preliminary hearing, the district court briefly
denied the defense claim that such actions do not constitute rape,
stressing the necessity of protecting minors online.85 This case also
ended in a plea bargain, replacing the rape offense with aggravated
indecent acts.86
At this point, one might get the impression that the verbal rape
paradigm was but a prosecutorial tool, pushing defendants into
pleading guilty to lesser charges. On the other hand, some
defendants have also pled guilty to charges of causing rape, asking
the court for leniency.87 One of these defendants, charged with
causing rape, sodomy, and indecent acts against thirty-three minors,
was sentenced to fourteen years of imprisonment.88 In 2015, at the
sentencing appeal, the Israeli Supreme Court stressed the severity of
the acts but nevertheless granted the appeal and reduced the sentence
to twelve years.89 It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Israel
did not address the new rape paradigm at all in this specific case.90
In 2016, two defendants pled guilty at the district court and were
therefore convicted in multiple cases of “facilitating rape” against

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
See id. The defendant made bail. Id.
See CrimA 2656/13 Doe v. State of Israel (Jan. 21, 2014) (Isr.) (on file with author).
The Supreme Court of Israel denied the defendant’s appeal. See id.
See Case (DC TA) 41309-12-14 State of Israel v. Morovati (Mar. 16, 2015) (Isr.) (on
file with author).
Id.
See Case (DC TA) 41309-12-14 State of Israel vs. Morovati (July 8, 2015) (Isr.) (on
file with author). The defendant was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment.
Id.
See CrimA 707/14 Doe v. State of Israel (July 6, 2015) (Isr.) (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
See id.
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minors.91 Later that year, another defendant pled guilty to facilitating
rape by blackmailing a young adult.92 This was the first application
of the new rape paradigm related to an adult victim—i.e., a young
female soldier.93 At the sentencing appeal, once again the Supreme
Court raised no questions whatsoever regarding the new
groundbreaking rape paradigm.94 It only emphasized the severity of
abusing a young person and added a sentence of five years
imprisonment instead of 3.5 at the end of 2018.95 The Supreme
Court denied the defendant’s appeal against his 4.5 year sentence.96
Judge Alex Stein emphasized the severity of the actions without
addressing the pioneering prosecutorial thesis.97
Thus far, the last appearance of the innovative paradigm of
facilitating rape against minors at the Supreme Court of Israel was in
March 2020, when, once again an online child abuser was charged
with causing rape, indecent acts, threats and more.98 In the District
Court, the defendant moved for dismissal, claiming that the legality
principle99 denies the possibility of charging him with offenses of
rape and indecent acts from a distance.100 The District Court denied
the claim, but allowed the defendant to make an elaborate plea at the
end of the case.101 According to the agreed upon plea bargain, the
rape indictment was dismissed and the defendant admitted to the
other offenses before being sentenced to three years of
imprisonment.102 In his appeal, the defendant claimed, once again,
that when performed from a distance, there can be no conviction for
rape and indecent act offenses.103 The Supreme Court maintained
that the defendant’s claims have no legal basis, as there is no
importance to the distinction between physical indecent acts and

91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Case (DC Hi) 9232-07-15 State of Israel v. Timsut (Mar. 28, 2016) (Isr.) (on file with
author); Case (DC CT) 34838-04-15 State of Israel v. Gavrilov (Apr. 11, 2016) (Isr.)
(on file with author).
CrimA 8720/15 State of Israel v. Pinto (Sept. 11, 2016) (Isr.) (on file with author).
See id.
See CrimA 3792/18 Doe vs. State of Israel (Nov. 11, 2018) (Isr.) (on file with author).
See id.
Id.
See id.
See CrimA 1195/19 Doe vs. State of Israel (Mar. 3, 2020) (Isr.) (on file with author).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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online ones.104 Since the Supreme Court did not directly address the
verbal rape thesis, it is clear, once again, that this thesis does not
provoke judicial criticism.105
So, although it was never critically affirmed in a formal verdict by
any court in Israel,106 verbal rape seems to be a legal reality in
Israel.107 It is doubtful that future verdicts will nullify the thesis,
since a few people have already been convicted and sentenced based
on it.108 Whether this legal reality is worthy or not is an entirely
different question.
This Article will not review the Israeli history of rape law and how
the legal provisions defining rape have developed, sometimes by
bizarre accidents, allowing the creative prosecution to give rise to a
new form of a rape offense.109 The central question is not doctrinal,
but normative. This Article inquires whether or not the rape offense
should cover such scenarios. When a person is brought by illintended communication to sexually touch or penetrate themself
while the perpetrator is far away, should the legal notion of rape
apply? Can words generate rape from afar?
The Israeli example proves that this expansion is more than an
academic exercise.110 Although this groundbreaking development is
the inspiration for this Article, by no means will this Article examine
the legal doctrines of rape in Israel and assess their applicability to
online scenarios. The following analysis will revolve around AngloAmerican notions and constructs of rape and examine if there is a
normative basis to take these notions further—i.e., into the cyber
world.111 Such an intricate question requires analysis of rape law, its
purpose and boundaries, as well as the implied interaction between
law and technology.112

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 87–105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–105 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Section II.C.
See infra Sections II.C–.G.
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II. SEXUAL OFFENSIVENESS GOES CYBER
A. Communication in the Age of Cyberspace
The ability to send someone a message from afar is nothing new.
For millennia, human and animal messengers have delivered
messages in this manner.113 As technology and economies evolved,
sending messages became easier and cheaper.114 People learned to
read and write and the printed word revolutionized the world of
communication.115 Professional post offices were born, and every
person could send a letter, even to the far side of the globe.116 The
telegraph opened the door for instantaneous communication.117 Later
the telephone enabled people to hear the voice of others from a
distance in real time.118 A person could now talk to friends, foes,
rivals or strangers directly; the communication could contain any
content, including harmful or even criminal content.119 Then came
cyberspace.
Cyberspace offers people numerous rich and innovative
possibilities and courses of action, including diverse ways of
communication.120 While every new communication technology has
brought its own advancements, as well as challenges, some suggest
that cyberspace is especially advanced and challenging.121 What post
offices and the telephone made cheap, cyberspace quickly made free:

113. E.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 76 (1983) (noting the Persian
and Roman Empires’ use of couriers on horseback).
114. See, e.g., id. at 98–100.
115. See, e.g., Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 74–76, 95–
96 (2016) (explaining the impact of the printing press and the evolution of literacy in
the United States).
116. See, e.g., POOL, supra note 113, at 79.
117. See West, supra note 115, at 96.
118. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL
STUD. 155, 158 (1997).
119. See, e.g., id.; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (stating the petitioner
was convicted of transmitting wagering information by phone from Los Angeles to
Miami and Boston).
120. See Perritt, Jr., supra note 118, at 160–64.
121. See POOL, supra note 113, at 91–96 (recounting the challenges of fitting evolving
telegraphic communications into legal frameworks); see Perritt Jr., supra note 118, at
162–63 (discussing how the internet challenges traditional sovereign state boundaries
and shapes legal institutions); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing
the Public International Legal System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 886–87 (2000) (describing
challenges set by older communication technologies and claiming that the challenges
set by cyberspace are unique).

2021]

Cyber Rape: Online Violations of Sexual Autonomy

371

people with online access can reach anyone, publish content, and
hear anyone else’s voice from around the globe.122
Regardless of the critical economic aspect, cyberspace introduced
many innovations to the world of communication.123 One is the
combination of voice and picture: the live video feed, a technology
which was once considered science fiction, is now a common banal
reality.124
This revolutionary technology opened many new
possibilities, including sexual ones,125 making it easier to locate
others with similar sexual taste.126 For example, one can see the
sexual acts of others in real time.127 When the two are consenting
adults, that is usually not considered a legal problem, or at least not a
sex offense.128 In other situations, it can become offensive and
abusive.129

122. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807,
1815, 1821, 1831, 1837 (1995) (foreseeing how the availability of speech possibilities
would change the world).
123. See Amitai Etzioni, Implications of Select New Technologies for Individual Rights
and Public Safety, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 261 (2002) (describing the shift from
old communication methods to cyberspace).
124. See Tiffany N. Beaty, Comment, Navigating the Safe Harbor Rule: The Need for a
DMCA Compass, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 207, 208 (2009).
125. See Edward Castronova, Fertility and Virtual Reality, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1085,
1092–93 (2009) (detailing how technology enables sexual options); see Robert
Bloomfield & Benjamin Duranske, Protecting Children in Virtual Worlds Without
Undermining Their Economic, Educational, and Social Benefits, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1175, 1185–86 (2009); see Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Law, Virtual
Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1076–77, 1082–83 (2018);
see Lillian Esposito, Note, Sexual Ageplay in Virtual Reality: Practicing Free Speech
or Producing Child Pornography?, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1913, 1921–24 (2019); see
also Yusef Al-Jarani, All Fun and (Mind) Games? Protecting Consumers from the
Manipulative Harms of Interactive Virtual Reality, 2019 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
299, 350 (2019) (describing possibly harmful new capabilities of sex via virtual
reality).
126. GREEN, supra note 28, at 45 (noting that the internet enables sexual possibilities for
people with idiosyncratic sexual tastes and interests).
127. E.g., Matthew Green, Comment, Sex on the Internet: A Legal Click or an Illicit
Trick?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 527, 530 (2002).
128. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711–12 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming
conviction of disseminating obscenity online); see also John F. McGuire, Note, When
Speech is Heard Around the World: Internet Content Regulation in the United States
and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 759–60 (1999) (discussing the Thomas case
and other criminal aspects of disseminating obscenity and pornography online).
129. E.g., Melissa Farley et al., Online Prostitution and Trafficking, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1039,
1079–80 (2014).
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A second related innovation is smart phones.130 Communication
devices were historically stationary, usable only in designated
places.131 The combination of smart phones and cyberspace has
made it possible to use one’s communication device almost anywhere
one goes.132 Smart phones are much more than just “phones.”133
One can use them for video chats, as they are also video cameras.
Smart phones can also take numerous high-quality photos and store
them for free.134 Thirty years ago, video cameras were very
expensive, large, and heavy, ensuring that videos were neither
spontaneous nor very secretive.135 Nowadays, filming a video is just
another smartphone application.136 A few decades ago, one needed a
camera to take about thirty pictures, and each photo cost money to
send to a third-party for developing, all before knowing how they
would turn out.137 Nowadays, one can take infinite high-resolution
photos for free, observe them immediately, and later post them or
send them to someone without the involvement of others.138 Such
photographs may be related to sex, as one can take pictures of their
naked body and send them to current or potential partners.139
Again, this is not considered a problem for consenting adults.
Technology is typically neither evil nor benevolent; it only provides
new possibilities for people to act upon.140 Some of them are

130. Hayley S. Strong, Casenote, “Sexting” to Minors in a Rapidly Evolving Digital Age:
Frix v. State Establishes the Applicability of Georgia’s Obscenity Statutes to Text
Messages, 61 MERCER L. REV 1283, 1283 (2009).
131. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of the Virtual Worlds Govern
Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 55, 58 (2012).
132. Id.
133. Strong, supra note 130, at 1283.
134. E.g., Fairfield, supra note 131, at 61–62.
135. See Steven Siegel, Note, The Video Revolution and the First Amendment:
Democratization of Media Production and Public Access to the Future “Electronic
Public Forum”, 8 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 257, 260 (1990).
136. See C. Scott Brown, Smartphone Stills Are Getting so Much Better, but What About
Video?, ANDROID AUTH. (March 23, 2019), https://www.androidauthority.com/smart
phone-video-features-964546/ [https://perma.cc/Y7AW-LPRY].
137. See Siegel, supra note 135, at 260.
138. See supra notes 133–34, 136 and accompanying text.
139. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1897–98 (2019)
(acknowledging the ability to share our naked bodies online).
140. See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1156 (2000)
(describing technology as the manipulation of the physical, biological, and logical
world); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, What is Legal Knowledge?: Towards a Law and
Technology Theory, 30 MAN. L.J. 383, 386 (2004) (stressing the dual nature of
technology).
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criminal as cyberspace paves numerous criminal roads,141 some of
them are virtual versions of old crimes, and some are innovative.142
A third innovation of cyberspace is the rich possibility of
conversing with strangers.143 Cyberspace is often a world of fantasy
and lies.144 Impersonating another in real life can be hard and
dangerous. On the other hand, going online, creating fictitious
profiles, and talking to strangers is both easy and relatively safe.145
No one sees the user for who they are, which makes them
uninhibited, for better or worse.146 One can find the courage to speak
to someone attractive, speak the truth, advocate for values, and
become the best version of themselves.147 But they can also turn to
the darkest corners of the net and become the worst version of
themselves.148
Cyber communication is closely related to another innovative
aspect of cyberspace, which is seemingly modest at first glance.149
Next to richer forms of communication—e.g., voice chat and video
141. See Charlotte Decker, Note, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the United
States Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. L.
REV. 959, 964 (2008) (noting every new technology provides criminal opportunities,
but cyberspace provides endless opportunities).
142. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 465, 471–72 (1997); see Michael Edmund O’Neill, Old Crimes in New
Bottles: Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 282 (2000); see Neal
Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1047–48,
1071–72 (2001); see Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U.
OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 213, 224–25 (2003); see also Susan W. Brenner, Toward a
Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 50–
51, 65, 68–70 (2004) (analyzing if and how cybercrime differs from offline crime).
143. See AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT,
TEENS, PRIVACY & SOCIAL NETWORKS: HOW TEENS MANAGE THEIR ONLINE
IDENTITIES AND PERSONAL INFORMATION IN THE AGE OF MYSPACE, 33–34, 36 (2007),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/media/Files/Reports
/2007/PIP_Teens_Privacy_SNS_Report_Final.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2MD-XX
5R].
144. See Paris Martineau, Internet Deception is Here to StaySo What Do We Do Now?,
WIRED (Dec. 30, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/internet-deceptionstay-what-do-now/ [https://perma.cc/63AW-VXZF].
145. See Katyal, supra note 142, at 1047–48.
146. See Andrea Chester & Di Bretherton, Impression Management and Identity Online, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 223, 223–25 (Adam N. Joinson et
al. eds., 2007) (noting that in cyberspace we can create new versions of ourselves,
including versions impossible to create offline).
147. See id. at 223–24.
148. See id. at 224.
149. See infra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
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chat—cyberspace, personal computers, and smart phones also offer
the possibility to simultaneously converse in writing only, all in a
fluent, easy, and accessible way.150 A written conversation may at
times be more disguised and it might feel more impersonal, as no one
hears the intonation of the other user’s voice.151 Psychologically, it
might be easier to threaten someone by written words than by their
own voice, to blackmail someone, and perhaps to violate their sexual
autonomy.152 Distance weakens empathy and accountability, and
requires less audaciousness.153
Any person may use technology, mainly cyberspace or
telecommunication, to bring another to sexually touch oneself.154
Whenever it is done with a free, informed, and competent form of
consent, it is seemingly none of our business. However, if consent is
defective, lacking freedom, information, or competency, should we
call it “rape?”
As discussed above, 155 this Article analyzes the concept of cyber
rape by looking at the three facets of the notion of rape: the physics
of the act;156 the settings of sexual interaction, with consideration of
attacks on sexual autonomy and the ability to replicate these things
online;157 and proper labeling of offensive sexual conduct in
cyberspace. 158

150. See Shashank V. Joshi et al., The Use of Technology by Youth: Implications for
Psychiatric Educators, 43 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 101, 101–02 (2019) (discussing various
means of modern communication and usage rates for different age brackets).
151. See ADAM N. JOINSON, UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNET BEHAVIOR:
VIRTUAL WORLDS, REAL LIVES 25 (2003); see also John Suler, The Online
Disinhibition Effect, 7 CYBERPSYCH. & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2004) (acknowledging the
disinhibition effect online due to user’s feeling of anonymity).
152. See Katelyn Y.A. McKenna, Through the Internet Looking Glass: Expressing and
Validating the True Self, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET PSYCHOLOGY 205,
212 (Adam N. Joinson et al. eds., 2007) (suggesting that online communication’s
elimination of physical hints disinhibits the users).
153. See Katyal, supra note 142, at 1071.
154. E.g., Martie P. Thompson & Deidra J. Morrison, Prospective Predictors of
Technology-Based Sexual Coercion by College Males, 3 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 233, 233–
35 (discussing study on the emerging threat of “technology-based coercive behaviors”
and potential risk factors for predatory behavior).
155. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
156. See infra Section II.B.
157. See infra Section II.C.
158. See infra Section II.G.
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B. Cyber Rape: The Physics of Offline Rape Versus Communicative
Rape
As stated above, rape as a concept historically only included
penial-vaginal penetration.159 Although that changed a while ago in
many countries,160 in order to include more scenarios, rape still
requires some sort of sexual penetration161 of only one of the three
penetrable parts.162 Accordingly, non-penetrative sexual assaults are,
per definition, not rape: no penetration, even a partial one,163 means
no rape.164 What happens to these physics when technology enters
the picture?
On the one hand, penetration is still possible. The offline rape
typically includes penetration by the perpetrator and that act cannot
be done from a distance yet.165 Nevertheless, bringing someone to
self-penetration is clearly possible, even from the other side of the
globe.166 Note the difference between penetration and masturbation:
whereas male masturbation typically does not involve penetration,
this act is excluded from the current notions of rape.167 Bringing

159. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
160. See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 171–72 (reviewing legislation in different countries
with regards to the element of penetration or lack thereof, and its normative vitality).
161. See Allen, supra note 26, at 1062 (acknowledging the distinction between rape and
battery, based on the rationale of sexual autonomy).
162. See Baker, supra note 26, at 227–28 (claiming that rape is unique regarding the
emotional, relational, hedonic, and dignitary injuries resulting from particular parts of
the body being touched or invaded and suggesting that this focus is related to
physiological or cultural reasons).
163. See Lutz-Priefert, supra note 26, at 97–98 (discussing requirement of penetration and
alternative definitions; supporting the FBI’s broad definition of penetration, including
any amount of vaginal or anal penetration by a body part or object).
164. But see Alberto Cadoppi & Michael Vitiello, A Kiss Is Just a Kiss, or Is It? A
Comparative Look at Italian and American Sex Crimes, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 191,
193 (2010) (reviewing broad Italian definition of rape—i.e., CODICE PENALE [C.P.]
art. 609-bis (Italy)—that requires no penetration and looks for coercion of sexual
acts); GREEN, supra note 28, at 64–65 (discussing broad conceptions of offenses
equivalent to rape in Canada, which do not require penetration).
165. See Tyler Patrick Lovejoy, Comment, A New Playground: Sexual Predators and
Pedophiles Online: Criminalizing Cyber Sex Between Adults and Minors, 20 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 311, 325–26 (2008) (stating that a sexually explicit conversation can
rise to the level of sexual conduct and be communicated over the phone without
penetration).
166. See id. at 325–27.
167. See Robert Sparrow & Lauren Karas, Teledildonics and Rape by Deception, 12 L.,
INNOVATION & TECH. 175, 195–96 (2020) (stressing the physiological differences in
online masturbation and its significance to the law of rape).
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people to masturbate in sexual ways without penetrations is left out
of any rape doctrine: no penetration, no rape.168
However,
normatively speaking, one certainly might suggest there should not
be a difference between self-penetration and other forms of intimate
self-touching. One may certainly be sexually victimized, objectified,
and humiliated, with self-penetration or without it.169
On the other hand, self-penetration seems very different from
penetration by another person’s organs or wielded inanimate objects.
In the offline rape, the victim feels the offender’s body on top or
against their own and might also feel the rapist’s fluids defile their
body. However, as we go online, the offender is not present, and the
victim does not necessarily feel the self-penetration as an offender’s
bodily invasion. Therefore, the online transition makes the offensive
scenario less intrusive.170 The offender’s scent and taste are also left
out of the picture. Even the offender’s proximity and visualization
are missing, which lessens the physical invasiveness. In these cases,
the force of penetration is not determined by the offender, even with
regards to insertion of inanimate objects, unless those objects are
operated from a distance.171 The offender is less in control of the
situation, which in turn means that less coercive pressure is
experienced by the victim.172 Since the victim has more control over
their own body, it might decrease any pain their touch may cause.
This significant change of physics might alleviate the victim’s
stressful experience.
Looking at the physics of sexual offensiveness online reveals an
exclusive method.173 Exploiting the victim and causing them to self-

168. See id. (illustrating the differences of the possibility of penetration while using
internet-enabled haptic sex toys between males and females while stating that if there
is no penetration, there is no possibility of being raped).
169. See Conaghan, supra note 1, at 171–72 (stressing that sexual autonomy is violated
even without penetration).
170. See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 195 (discussing the sensations essential to
physical sexual acts, which are arguably not present in offline rape).
171. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1094; see also Sparrow & Karas, supra
note 167, at 178 (discussing the possibility of remote operation of sex toys during
online communications).
172. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1099–101 (discussing factors present in
online interactions that limit the offender’s power such as the choice not to place a
haptic device on one’s private areas, the ability to define an individual’s version of
consent online, and the ability to change the user’s avatar).
173. Compare Baker, supra note 26, at 228 (discussing how an essential part of rape has
been the non-consensual touching of certain parts of the body), with Sparrow &
Karas, supra note 167, at 191 (discussing how the use of haptic technology can result
in rape even when there is apparent consent or no physical touching by the predator).
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execute the penetration introduces a unique method of violating the
victim’s rights—there is no way around it for the perpetrator.
Namely, we are not witnessing a nuance of a known sexual offense
paradigm, but instead, a new paradigm of sexual offensiveness.174
In addition, coercive rape requires the rapist to be aware that the
victim does not consent.175 Criminal law doctrine requires the
coercive rapist to be aware, in real time, that the penetration is
against the victim’s free will.176 This doctrine sharpens the
aggression and offensiveness of the physical act: the physical rapist
must, physically or figuratively, meet the victim’s eyes and see their
victimization in real time.177 The perpetrator might even find
pleasure in hurting another victim’s body and soul, or experience
sexual pleasure while seeing others suffer, objectified, and exploited.
On the other hand, penetration by distant communication offers the
perpetrator a convenient mental detachment from the experience of
wronging another being.178 In offline rape by fraud, deception allows
the perpetrator to avoid looking into the victim’s eyes while the latter
realizes the truth and discovers victimization.179 In online selfpenetration by fraud, the perpetrator does not need to look into the
eyes of the victim while they commit the offense.180

174. See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 196–97 (discussing the limitations on claims
which can be brought if the use of internet-enabled haptic sex toys is deemed
masturbation rather than sex).
175. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1073–74 (claiming that dominant social norms
discourage partners from recognizing cues of non-consent).
176. See Victoria Brown et al., Review Article, Twenty-First Annual Review of Gender
and the Law: Annual Review Article: Rape & Sexual Assault, 21 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
367, 373 (2020) (writing that most states have provisions banning sexual contact that
is coerced, or that the perpetrator knew was not consented to).
177. See generally An Updated Definition of Rape, supra note 38 (explaining U.S. Justice
Department’s rape definition and the difference between rape and forcible rape).
178. See generally Heather Murphy, What Experts Know About Men Who Rape, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/health/men-rape-sexualassault.html [https://perma.cc/2HUZ-6JQP] (“Indeed, experts note one last trait
shared by men who have raped: they do not believe they are the problem.”).
179. See Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 48
(1998) (explaining rape by deception).
180. See generally Jan M. Olsen, Swedish Man Gets 10 Years for Online Rape of
American, Canadian Teens, USA TODAY (Nov. 30, 2017, 9:24 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/11/30/sex-offenses-online-rapeparenting-teens/911966001/ [https://perma.cc/JK6G-C8MU] (“A 41-year-old Swedish
man was convicted of rape and sentenced to 10 years in prison . . . for coercing young
teenagers . . . to perform sexual acts in front of webcams by threatening them or their
families.”).
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Further, the experience of the offender is inherently different.181
The offender’s senses do not experience the online scenario as they
do offline.182 The offender does not get to touch and smell; at times,
the offender does not get to hear; sometimes the offender does not
even get to see; and when the offender does see, the sight is relatively
limited.183 If the act is filmed, the offender can review the recorded
crime and revisit it later,184 disseminate or use it to further blackmail,
or employ other forms of criminality that typical coercive rapes may
not include.185
C. Cyber Rape: The Settings Leading to Communicative Rape
There is nothing inherently wrong with sexual penetrations. Many
of us practice them, desire them, and fantasize about them, as human
culture is widely and deeply sexual.186 What makes sexual
penetrations criminal is not their physics, but rather how they are
carried out—i.e., their settings, the lack of consent to sex, or
defective consent.187 The normative foundations of rape are sexual
penetrations combined with the violation of personal autonomy.188

181. See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
182. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
183. See generally Jenny Morber, What Science Says About Arousal During Rape,
POPULAR SCI. (May 31, 2013), https://www.popsci.com/science/article/2013-05/scie
nce-arousal-during-rape/ [https://perma.cc/G8YM-Q7VG] (explaining that rapists
often try to get a physical response from their victims to feel dominant).
184. See Kelly Muldavin, Cruel to Be Kind: The Societal Response to Technology and
Youth Sexual Expression, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 425, 446–47 (2019) (explaining
the lasting dangers in taking and sending sexual pictures to others).
185. See Danielle Citron & Mary Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); see Berkseth et al., supra note 31, at 808–11 (describing the
phenomenon of revenge porn, which includes the dissemination and watching of
private sex); see John Kip Corwell, Sexting: 21st-Century Statutory Rape, 66 SMU L.
REV. 111, 115 (2013) (describing the intrusion to privacy in technological sexual
contents); see also Stuart P. Green, To See and Be Seen: Reconstructing the Law of
Voyeurism and Exhibitionism, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 209–10, 214–39 (2018)
(analyzing the proper criminalization of voyeurism and claiming that it significantly
infringes the victim’s sexual autonomy due to lack of consent).
186. See Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture: A Review, 16 R. GEN. PSYCH. 161,
161–63 (2012) (analyzing the differences in sexual relationships throughout history).
187. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape
as Sexual Abuse of Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 150 (2011) (explaining that
the common law definition of rape included both a lack of consent and a physical act
of violence).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
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Under the notion of personal autonomy, one is free to be harmed if
they so choose, even when others deem this choice folly,189 thus
denying paternalism as the subjugation of self-determination to the
notion of what is best for that person.190 Personal autonomy wields
the power of consent.191 It plays important roles in numerous fields
of law.192 It relates to human rights, making moral changes and
turning illegal actions into legal ones.193 Consent can sometimes
modify an array of rights and suspend duties to act or to avoid acting
in certain manners.194 Substantive criminal law treats people as
rational and turns compliance into a wall that separates accepted
actions and criminalized actions.195 Consent is often the sole
difference between criminal and legal acts, as its absence begets a
social harm; “volenti non fit injuria,” meaning to one who is willing
no harm is done.196 Consent excludes various offenses like rape,
kidnapping, theft, and burglary.197

189. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS
115 (1984) (illustrating consensual self-harm).
190. See FEINBERG, supra note 47, at 57, 68–69; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 47, at 765
(explaining paternalism).
191. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO
STATE J. CRIM. L. 397, 402 (2016) (describing consent as a power and as an internal
mental choice with willed acquiescence that comports with the consenter’s
autonomy); see Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232,
2235 (2020) (explaining that consent is morally important because it expresses
personal autonomous will); see also Chiesa, supra note 46, at 426 (portraying consent
as “the vehicle through which legal actors translate concerns about autonomy into
legally workable standards and rules.”).
192. See Peter Westen, Some Common Confusions About Consent in Rape Cases, 2 OHIO
STATE J. CRIM. L. 333, 333 (2004) (illustrating the role of consent in contract,
property, and tort law); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21 (2015) (noting consent has different meanings across
various areas of law including a relatively broad definition in criminal law).
193. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121, 124
(1996).
194. See Westen, supra note 192, at 334.
195. See Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923, 924 (2008)
(explaining the role of consent in criminal law).
196. Volenti non fit injuria, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Vera
Bergelson, Lecture, The 2008 David J. Stoffer Lecture: Autonomy, Dignity, and
Consent to Harm, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 723 (2008).
197. See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 171–74 (2007) (elaborating on the history of consent in
substantive criminal law).
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Although the role of consent is not always coherent,198 at least in
some cases, its importance is clear.199 It defines the line between
legal and illegal, between social acceptance and criminalization.200
Consent has a crucial function in the rape offense, signaling the
moral line between criminal and socially accepted sexual contact.201
Nevertheless, although rape scholarship revolves around consent,202
it remains a vague concept203—in spite of being the most discussed
term regarding this offense—and there is no unified understanding
regarding this critical issue.204
Consent is a vague concept because is not a narrow notion, but a
very expansive one. One might wonder if it is a mental state or an
expression,205 or suggest diverse and complex ways to distinguish
various forms of consent: factual consent versus legal consent,
practical consent versus imputed consent, and so forth.206 Indeed, it
has both a generic meaning and a very specific meaning
simultaneously.207 So it is not always clear what we mean when we
say there is no consent.

198. Dan-Cohen, supra note 47, at 768–73 (discussing consensual slavery); see Bergelson,
supra note 197, at 214–25; see Bergelson, supra note 196, at 729–34.
199. See Bergelson, supra note 197, at 214–25.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 187–97.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 187–97.
202. ESTRICH, supra note 37, at 1095–96, 1121; TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 90–136
(analyzing consent regarding rape); see also Craig T. Byrnes, Comment, Putting the
Focus Where It Belongs: Mens Rea, Consent, Force, and the Crime of Rape, 10 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 277, 278, 283 (1998).
203. See Munro, supra note 195, at 940–41 (noting the deeply distorted meaning of
consent, which has become unrecognizable and useless in the rape law context;
calling to rephrase the term of consent to clarify rape law).
204. See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 958–59 (2008).
205. See Westen, supra note 192, at 340–43; see also PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF
CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL CONDUCT 4–7 (Routledge 2016) (2004) (elaborating on the four basic
notions of consent).
206. Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the
Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899, 902–04 (2008); see Westen,
supra note 192, at 340–41; see also H.M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent
and its Implications for the Law on Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147, 148 (1996)
(discussing the meaning of consent).
207. See Westen, supra note 192, at 342–44.
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Typically, we mean one of four options.208 First, we might mean
there is a complete lack of consent in light of the victim’s persistent
refusal, or due to the victim’s lack of any knowledge of the act.209
Second, we might mean that consent is not freely given, but derived
from direct coercion.210 Third, the consent is uninformed because
compliance is based on false understandings of the scenario, the
requested act and its consequences, the identity and traits of the
requesting party, and so forth.211 Fourth and finally, the consent is
incompetently given because some people are considered legally
unfit to consent to some acts.212
Section I.A described three types of offensive sex: coercive sex,
fraudulent sex, and sex with an incompetent victim.213 Each type of
violation involves a different level of consent, protecting a different
layer of sexual autonomy by assessing freedom, information, and
competency.214 Can the levels of consent be violated from a
distance, and are these violations normatively equal to their offline
counterparts?
D. Cyber-Coercive
Coercion is more than force, much more. Indeed, many laws do
not count sex based on nonphysical coercion as rape.215 However,
even an insinuated threat—e.g., a threat of public humiliation or of

208. See Green, supra note 46, at 212–14; see also Chiesa, supra note 46, at 422–23
(measuring consent and autonomy along the dimensions of non-coercion,
competency, and information).
209. See Green, supra note 46, at 212.
210. See Bergelson, supra note 197, at 188–89 (explaining that even freedom from direct
coercion is extremely valuable); see also Munro, supra note 195, at 924, 931
(addressing exploitive practices that challenge the freedom of choice).
211. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 344–45
(2013) (stressing the imperfection of information in any decision to have sex).
212. See Green, supra note 46, at 212 (describing the capacity to consent and explaining
that a person who is unconscious, heavily intoxicated, of very low intelligence,
mentally ill, or a minor may be deemed incapable of giving consent).
213. See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 46–63 and accompanying text.
215. Hanus, supra note 26, at 1149, 1151 (stating that many U.S. states do not criminalize
rape by nonphysical coercion and the states that do criminalize nonphysical coercive
sex as rape lack supporting case law); see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent and
Coercion, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 969–70, 992–93 (2018) (analyzing draft revisions to
the Model Penal Code dealing with “Sexual Assault by Coercion or Exploitation,”
including intercourse by coercion and proposing an alternative“Sex by Threat”).
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termination from employment216—can be effective without the use of
force or weapons.217 Sometimes, for example, when the victim feels
compelled to do anything asked by the perpetrator, threats are not
needed.218 If we think free will is worthy of protection, we should
not consider the use or threat of force as a crucial element for rape
convictions.219 Those who believe criminal coercion includes more
than force and threats of force might agree coercion is even possible
online.
What happens to free will in cyberspace? Freedom of consent is
certainly vulnerable online.220 Social pressures can push sexual
actions online, along with blackmail or “sextortion.”221 A person
might threaten and blackmail another into action, including selfpenetration. Blackmail might work from great distances, for instance
by threatening to publish intimate photos, because such threats have
nothing to do with physical proximity. Even if threats and
intimidation tactics are in some respects weaker from afar because
coercion is off the table, freedom is never completely safe.222 Fear
and terror can rise from great distances. Obviously, blackmail
scenarios severely violate freedom of consent.223 But is this violation

216. GREEN, supra note 28, at 117–22 (reviewing coercive threats and describing
hypothetical scenarios); see Ferzan, supra note 215, at 976–77; see also Michal
Buchhandler–Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and in
the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 442–44 (2010) (discussing threats that
lead to intercourse).
217. See Schulhofer, supra note 44, at 339 (describing a continuum of force, including
various threats).
218. See Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for
Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 718–19 (2000) (discussing scenarios of peer
pressure and non-force coercion).
219. Baker, supra note 26, at 228 (stressing that disregarding and “[o]verriding the
victim’s will that she not to be touched in that particular area by that particular person
constitutes the gravamen of rape”); see also Hanus, supra note 26, at 1168–70
(arguing to criminalize nonphysical coercion of sex as rape and suggesting that the
rationales of criminalizing rape also apply to nonphysical coercion of sex).
220. See, e.g., Aaron Robbins, Note, Solving the Sextortion Puzzle: Piecing Together a
Model State Sextortion Statute, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 761, 761–62, 764–65 (2019)
(describing nonconsensual sextortion in an online dating scenario and explaining that
threats are the basis for sextortion).
221. See id. at 763, 768–73 (defining and illustrating sextortion using U.S. legal cases); see
also Muldavin, supra note 184, at 441–43, 447–50 (discussing the problem of teen
peer pressure for sexting and the problem of sextortion).
222. See Robbins, supra note 220, at 766–67.
223. See Falk, supra note 179, at 52, 73, 86 (discussing sex by extortion as rape and
describing cases of blackmail).
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normatively equal to the violation entailed in a physically coercive
rape?
Autonomy is not binary but scalar.224 While our freedom of choice
is vulnerable online, autonomy is not annihilated completely in
cyberspace and in other forms of distant communication.225 We
enjoy one special form of privilege there—the freedom to
instantaneously cease and terminate communication without facing
immediate physical danger. Closing online windows is the simplest
of actions, one done numerous times daily by any user (minors and
children included). One can also simply block specific users, which
is a miserable one and by no means an ideal choice. Nevertheless, a
fragment of personal autonomy remains—the capacity to choose
between cooperation and other forms of action. The latter includes
ignoring the demand and terminating all communications with the
blackmailer; seeking help of parents, family, friends and community;
and finally, calling the police.226 Those are all risky choices, and we
must not judge victims who succumb to criminal tactics. Still, these
choices are more available and accessible in online coercion than in
direct physical coercion.227 In the offline world, victims who choose
to resist potentially put themselves in further danger.228 Physical
rapists who coerce victims to perform acts of self-penetration might
threaten violence if the victim refuses to comply by moving to
perform the penetration with their own physical organs or objects,
often much more brutally.229 This is not the case for victims who are
physically distant from the perpetrators.230
Theoretically, all victims are potentially stronger from a distance
when not required to physically defend themselves, a danger which
often arises in physical confrontations, even for unconscious

224. Chiesa, supra note 46, at 423 (arguing that autonomy is scalar and includes different
degrees).
225. See id. at 425–26 (“The degree of autonomy that obtains in any given situation is
directly proportional to the amount of information that the agent has prior to acting.”).
226. See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 449–50 (discussing infrequent reporting in
sextortion cases).
227. See infra notes 228–32 and accompanying text.
228. See Kaplan, supra note 28, at 1056 (stressing that the resistance element in rape law
requires the victim to place themself in danger of increased force and injury). But see
Baker, supra note 26, at 255 (arguing that resistance is effective in reducing rape,
while not increasing the chances of injury).
229. See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 196.
230. See id. at 181–82.
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victims.231 Similarly, victims of subtler online coercion have more
options than victims who physically confront the coercing party.232
E. Cyber-Deceitful
The law of rape does not forbid intercourse derived from fraudulent
temptation, as long as the deceived party was well aware of agreeing
to intercourse.233 At most, Anglo-American law criminalizes a very
narrow array of sex by fraud, like “medical treatment,” which
involves intercourse or impersonation of a spouse in the dark of
night.234 These acts are often considered lighter offenses, or even not
criminalized at all.235 Nonetheless, since fraud and autonomy are not
compatible,236 fraudulent sex is, by definition, offensive and violates
the victim’s sexual autonomy.237 If we perceive fraudulent sex as
problematic, and possibly even as rape, we can go one step further
and examine the potential of fraud from afar.
What happens to sexual fraud in cyberspace? Honesty and trust,
important social values,238 which are seemingly protected under the
doctrine of rape by fraud, are actually more vulnerable to
manipulation from a distance.239

231. See Falk, supra note 59, at 131–33 (stressing that many sedated victims wake up in
the middle of the sexual attack).
232. See supra notes 220–31 and accompanying text.
233. See McJunkin, supra note 28, at 9–12.
234. Id. at 8–9 (stressing Nebraska is the only state with a broad rape statute that
criminalizes all fraud relating to nominal identity; however, no state court has ever
affirmed a rape conviction for impersonating a boyfriend, girlfriend, lover, or friend);
Hong, supra note 28, at 287–88; Alexandra Brodksy, Rape-Adjacent: Imagining
Legal Responses to Nonconsensual Condom Removal, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
183, 197–98 (2017) (criticizing U.S. laws related to consensual sex involving
nonconsensual lack of condom use or removal); see also Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at
1397–1402.
235. See Russell L. Christopher & Kathryn H. Christopher, Adult Impersonation: Rape by
Fraud as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 92–97 (2007) (noting
that less than a third of American jurisdictions criminalize impersonating a spouse for
sex as rape).
236. Sommers, supra note 191, at 2239–40 (explaining that deception thwarts autonomy);
see also Rubenfeld, supra note 46, at 1379, 1402–03 (emphasizing that fraud“one
of autonomy’s two greatest enemies, along with force”violates sexual autonomy).
237. See Kristen L. Isaacson, Note, Rape by Fraud or Impersonation: A Necessary
Addition to Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 1781,
1799–1800 (1999) (writing that because sexual contact obtained by fraud or
impersonation is devoid of consent, it breaches sexual autonomy).
238. See Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 557, 564–66 (2009) (elaborating on the value of trust).
239. See Susser et al., supra note 50, at 29, 31–32.
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Online we often do not see the counterpart who contacts us.240 It is
therefore hard to identify who is on the other side—as it may be a
man or a woman, an adult or a minor, and so on—because we often
lack any visible hints.241 Online relationships depend less on the
visible traits which are crucial offline;242 therefore, informed consent
is more challenging to obtain than in the physical realm.243 Passing
information to others seems almost inherently more vague and often
also dubious online.
Fraud is much easier online than in the physical world, because
one’s online identity can be elusive and malleable.244 Identity can be
easily disguised and hidden, concealing material information from
the other party.245 In real life, a seventy-year-old male cannot
impersonate a seven-year-old girl—his appearance and voice will
expose him immediately. In the digital world, on the other hand, he
surely and easily can.246 Unlike offline encounters, cyberspace
enables users to portray themselves differently.247 It is not surprising
that impersonation is pervasive in social networks.248
The

240. See infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
241. This is not a new observation. See Sara Kiesler et al., Social Psychological Aspects of
Computer-Mediated Communication, 39 AM. PSYCH. 1123, 1125–26 (1984).
242. See JOANIE FARLEY GILLISPIE & JAYNE GACKENBACH, CYBER RULES: WHAT YOU
REALLY NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE INTERNET 86 (2007) (suggesting that online
relationships are less dependent on visible traits, which are crucial offline).
243. See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 199–201.
244. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 125, at 1100–01 (stressing the easiness of online
impersonations and the challenges of consent).
245. See Nazgole Hashemi & Tannaz H. Hashemi, Don’t Let Them Fool Ya: An
Examination of Regulation Crowdfunding as a Framework for Federal Protection
Against Online Dating Risks, 53 U. S.F. L. REV. 421, 428–32 (2019) (explaining the
dangers of deception in online dating).
246. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
247. See Katelyn McKenna & Gwendolyn Seidman, You, Me, and We: Interpersonal
Processes in Electronic Groups, in THE SOCIAL NET: HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN
CYBERSPACE 191, 207 (Yair Amichai-Hamburger ed., 2005) (portraying the
uniqueness of electronic communication).
248. Kori Clanton, Note, We Are Not Who We Pretend to Be: ODR Alternatives to Online
Impersonation Statutes, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 325–29 (2014)
(addressing the failure to hold social media platforms liable for identity theft); Colleen
M. Koch, Comment, To Catch a Catfish: A Statutory Solution for Victims of Online
Impersonation, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 233, 239–45, 248–51 (2017) (analyzing identity
theft on social networks and the legal responses thereto); see also Maksim Reznik,
Comment, Identity Theft on Social Networking Sites: Developing Issues of Internet
Impersonation, 29 TOURO L. REV. 455, 457–72 (2013) (explaining common forms of
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information highway promises no informed consent, as lies and
deception are abundant on every road.249 Some of those deceitful
roads lead to physical encounters, including romantic and sexual
ones.250 Other roads lead to sexual communication, some of which
lead to self-penetrations.251 Technology offers greater opportunities
for deception, and provides a vaster, more diverse pool of potential
victims.252
While impersonation and deception seem easier and richer online,
in certain contexts they are harder and perhaps also less appealing for
the offenders.253 Impersonating a real person, rather than a fictitious
one, may prove tricky. For instance, impersonating one’s spouse
online is far from easy, for one usually has specific communication
mediums with their spouse; and even when one gains access to that
medium, the transition to sexual communication is more complicated
because sexual interaction between spouses already has specific
features, times, and places.254 Impersonating a physician online is
not difficult, but gaining enough trust to falsely move another into
self-penetration is more complicated.255 The perpetrators’ motivation
and satisfaction in such acts are certainly different, as they cannot
touch, smell, or even be physically close to their victim.256

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

254.

255.

256.

identity theft on social media—e.g., the creation of fake accounts and impersonating
existing accounts).
See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 186–92 (stressing that cyberspace facilitates
deception in various contexts).
See Irina D. Manta, Tinder Lies, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207, 230–35 (2019)
(analyzing the different types of lies used on dating websites based on their severity).
See Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 178–79 (analyzing futuristic selfpenetrations that will be done remotely by digital online sex toys).
See Manta, supra note 250, at 234–35 (stressing the increase of opportunities for
wrongdoers concerning technology).
See, e.g., Scott Matteson, 10 Tips for Dealing with an Online Impersonator,
TECHREPUBLIC (July 1, 2019, 10:17 AM), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/10-tip
s-for-dealing-with-an-online-impersonator/ [https://perma.cc/9BLA-Z44W] (examining the difficulties of online impersonation).
See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 235, at 99102; see, e.g., Victor
Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone Online?, TIME (Jan. 22,
2013), https://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-for-impersonating-so
meone-online/ [https://perma.cc/A88F-N5HX] (describing intimate partner
impersonation).
See Christopher & Christopher, supra note 235, at 84; see, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 825
A.2d 1224, 1225–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (detailing case involving
defendant who impersonated a physician to coerce minors into self-penetration).
See supra notes 169–72 and accompanying text.
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F. Cyber-Incompetent
Historically, the statutory rape offense criminalized sex with young
females, including consensual sex, perceiving them as in need of
special legal protection, and defending their “innocence” to preserve
the girls as attractive potential brides and prevent them from
becoming “financial burdens” on their fathers.257 The modern
statutory rape offense is gender-neutral,258 and it now seeks to
preserve morality or protect minors from themselves, perceiving
them as easily susceptible to coercion and manipulation.259 It also
tries to prevent physical consequences like pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases.260 If we perceive teenagers and children as
susceptible to sexual abuse and incapable of providing meaningful
consent to sexual acts, we can take it a step further.
What happens to sexual incompetency online? Cyberspace
requires minimal hardware, software, and connection—it does not
account for legal competency.261 In fact, minors abound in
cyberspace, probably at higher rates than adults.262 Minors converse

257. Meredith Cohen, Comment, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel
and Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 717, 725–27
(2008); Lisa Pearlstein, Note, Walking the Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using
International Legal Standards to Serve the Best Interests of Juvenile Offenders and
Victims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (2010) (describing the history of statutory
rape); see also Tina M. Allen, Comment, Gender-Neutral Statutory Rape Laws: Legal
Fictions Disguised as Remedies to Male Child Exploitation, 80 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 111, 112–13 (2002).
258. Note, Feminist Legal Analysis and Sexual Autonomy: Using Statutory Rape Laws as
an Illustration, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076, 1080–81 (1999) (noting that statutory
rape laws protect vulnerable minors from harms of sexual activities); see also
Olszewski, supra note 56, at 695.
259. High, supra note 56, at 791 (writing that public discourse focuses on minors’
presumed immaturity and inexperience and their susceptibility to sexual manipulation
and coercion); see also Norah M. Roth, Note, It’s Not Rape-Rape: Statutory Rape
Classification Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1653,
1676 (2011) (claiming that adolescents may be particularly susceptible to
manipulation and coercion by adults).
260. Pearlstein, supra note 257, at 112–13 (describing how teenage pregnancy rekindled
the enforcement of statutory rape in the 1990s); Oberman, supra note 218, at 734–38
(attacking the historic rationale of teenage pregnancy); see High, supra note 56, at
822 (noting various harms of underage sex); see also Elizabeth Hollenberg, Note, The
Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage
Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 269–71 (1999).
261. See infra notes 262–76 and accompanying text.
262. See Emily DiRoma, Comment, Kids Say the Darndest Things: Minors and the
Internet, 2019 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 43, 47 (2018) (citing Amanda Lenhart,
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with each other and adults online, sometimes about sex, and
sometimes while touching themselves in a sexual manner.263
Unlike truth and awareness, which are often made to be vague
online, it is hard to say if and how cyberspace affects competency.
Competency falls in the realm of formal law and is not an objective
state.264 If competency is an age-based trait, cyberspace cannot do
anything in that respect; it makes no one older or younger.265
However, if competency is about personal abilities, perhaps
cyberspace does affect it somehow.
One might argue that cyberspace has no such effects, and that
minors are as vulnerable as beforeor even more sobecause of the
gap between sophisticated and experienced adults versus innocent
minors online. Innocence can surely be exploited online, specifically
when it comes to minors and other incompetent victims.266
Alternatively, if innocence is what statutory rape aims to protect,
we are losing the battle in certain respects.267 Before cyberspace,

263.
264.

265.
266.

267.

Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/04/09/teens-social-media-technology-201
5/ [https://perma.cc/3VVW-HKF6]) (stressing the major role of the internet in
children and teenage lives nowadays).
See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 427, 437–40 (discussing how teen internet and
mobile phone use has normalized teenage sexual exploration via sexting).
See High, supra note 56, at 794 (arguing the approach to competency in the realm of
statutory rape law is problematic as an objective bright-line rule and not as a
subjective spectrum).
See Chester & Bretherton, supra note 146, at 223–24.
DJ Mico, Protecting the Digital Playgrounds: Narrowly Tailoring the Meaning of
“Social Media” to Prohibit Sexual Predators from Using Social Media, 51 U. PAC. L.
REV. 123, 124–25 (2019); Marilyn M. McMahon & Elizabeth A. Kirley, When Cute
Becomes Criminal: Emoji, Threats and Online Grooming, 21 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
37, 60–61 (2019); Stephen Beemsterboer, Student-Written Article, COPPA Killed the
Video Star: How the YouTube Settlement Shows that COPPA Does More Harm Than
Good, 25 ILL. BUS. L.J. 63, 73–74 (2020); Jaynee Mathis, Updating the Law to Keep
Pace with Newsfeeds and Online Victimization: The Need for Limited Access to Sex
Offenders’ Online Identifiers, 49 SW. L. REV. 169, 179–80 (2020); Justine Wagner,
Immersive Virtual Reality: Minnesota Legislature’s Opportunity to Protect Children
from Sexual Exploitation by Enacting a Well-Defined Criminal Statute, 46 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 407, 412–14 (2020) (highlighting the increased internet access of
children and their vulnerability to sexual abuse online); see also Kelsey K. Chetosky,
Comment, Minnesota v. Muccio: The Constitutionality of Minnesota’s Sexual
Grooming Law, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 2–3 (2019).
Jordan Franklin, Comment, Where Art Thou, Privacy?: Expanding Privacy Rights of
Minors in Regard to Consensual Sex: Statutory Rape Laws and the Need for A
“Romeo and Juliet” Exception in Illinois, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 309, 317 (2012)
(arguing that the legislative intent behind statutory rape laws is to protect the
innocence of children); see also Cohen, supra note 257, at 727–28.
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children were less exposed to pornography because they could not
access it so easily.268 For a while now, the reality has been materially
different.269 Pornography is but a fraction of the problematic content
available online.270 Technology and social practices have changed
and sexual content is everywhere.271
One might suggest that the amount of sexual content exposure
online means that many adolescents are more curious and interested
in some forms of sexual activity.272
Even if it makes us
uncomfortable, adolescents are sexual creatures and they engage in
sexual acts both online273 and offline.274 Even if contributing to their
decision to engage in sexual activity online is potentially harmful,
one might claim that it is not as harmful as having physical
intercourse. Perhaps the legal protection should be different,
thinking that their capacity to consent to online communication is

268. Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1203, 1239–40 (2000) (stressing that children’s access to pornography changes
dramatically online, making the compartmentalization of pornography difficult); see
also Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 503–04 (1999).
269. Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children: The European
Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175, 181 (2004) (noting that children have free, instant,
and anonymous access to extreme sexual content, and there are no significant
limitations on children’s exposure to pornography); see also Daniel Mark Cohen,
Unhappy Anniversary: Thirty Years Since Miller v. California: The Legacy of the
Supreme Court’s Misjudgment on Obscenity, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 545, 552 (2003).
270. See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3,
34–40 (2004) (maintaining that children’s exposure to violent content is more harmful
than their exposure to pornography, yet this content is widespread and unbound by
law); see also Scott A. Pyle, Note, Is Violence Really Just Fun and Games?: A
Proposal for a Violent Video Game Ordinance That Passes Constitutional Muster, 37
VAL. U. L. REV. 429, 479–82 (2002) (discussing the possibility of limiting children’s
exposure to violent video games).
271. See GREEN, supra note 28, at 194 (claiming that new technologies and new social
practices have “lowered the threshold of what society regards as private while
increasing the potential for resulting harm to victims”).
272. Muldavin, supra note 184, at 441–42 (discussing how modern media influences
young people to engage in sexual exploration via sexting); see also High, supra note
56, at 787–88 (noting how the Internet exposes youth to sexual content more than
ever before).
273. See Airelle Mills, Juvenile Sexting: A Harsh Reality, 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
ONLINE 3, 5–6 (2019); see also Muldavin, supra note 184, at 437–40 (describing teen
peer sexting as a normalized part of teenage lives).
274. See High, supra note 56, at 796–97, 837 (stressing that intercourse and other sexual
acts are common among American youth, including those legally unable to consent).
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somewhat wider than their capacity to consent to physical sex.275 On
the other hand, considering their limited capacities and greater
vulnerabilities to other ways of violating their sexual autonomy—
including coercion and deception—we should provide them with
greater legal protection.276
G. Cyber Rape: Proper Labeling and Public Paradigm
Rape is clearly a unique offense known to be extremely
traumatic.277 It invokes severe legal and social stigmatization.278
Only a handful of offenses enflame such social loathing.279 Criminal
stigma is a powerful condemnation tool.280 This tool loses parts of its
vitality as the offense grows ever wider: the more the offense
expands, the vaguer its social message will become.281 Because the
legal label of “rapist” is significant, it is important to use it carefully
and coherently.282

275. A minor’s increased ability to consent in online communication is based on the
assumption that the other party is not fraudulent (a matter related to rape by fraud and
not to statutory rape). See Milda Macenaite & Eleni Kosta, Consent for Processing
Children’s Personal Data in the EU: Following in US Footsteps?, 26 INFO. &
COMMC’NS TECH. L. 146, 15455 (2017).
276. See Muldavin, supra note 184, at 443–52 (analyzing how sexual coercions involving
sexting harms teenagers).
277. Baker, supra note 26, at 253–54; Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape
Culture with Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 21–22 (2016) (claiming that
rape inflicts one of the most severe types of traumas, with long-term adverse
outcomes); Aya Gruber, Rape Law Revisited, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 279, 282–83
(2016) (arguing that the separation between rape and sex is trauma); Yung, supra note
192, at 20–21 (distinguishing rape from ordinary batteries, stating the former includes
a violation of an individual’s psyche with high risks of physiological and
psychological effects, like post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and suicide); see
also Allen, supra note 26, at 1075.
278. See John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OFFENCES AND
DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 1, 4–6, 8–9 (John
Gardner ed., 1st ed. 2008).
279. See Allen, supra note 26, at 1037.
280. See id. at 1053–54 (illustrating the role of stigma; defining stigma as the marking of a
person, identifying them as criminal, deviant, and otherwise deserving of ostracism
and condemnation).
281. See Green, supra note 46, at 219–20.
282. Id. (arguing “autonomy is a highly variegated concept,” and that some of its facets are
more important than others); TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 67 (discussing the proposition
of introducing a severity ladder to rape law); see also Glanville Williams, Rape is
Rape, 142 NEW L.J. 11, 13 (1992) (stressing the importance of distinguishing between
different types of rape).
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In the context of criminal law, rape is a legal term established by a
legislature and a normative component entailing two possible
messages.283 The name often tells a social story; however, the
unification of several scenarios under one title or term as opposed to
separate offenses and designations sends another message.284 The
notion of proper labeling suggests that an offense should accurately
describe the forbidden conduct, to precisely convey the wrongness
and harmfulness it entails, and to reflect the differing levels of
severity for different actions.285 The law must fairly represent the
nature and harshness of the violation.286 This is the principle of fair
labeling.287
The legal label of a crime can be very valuable. While reviewing
someone’s criminal record, the legal label signals to the public and
authorities the message of who a person is.288 It has an expressive
meaning289 and must be as accurate and sharp as possible.290 Names
for offenses send social messages and should be as clear as possible,
even if other forces will modify them later.291 An accurate label is
beneficial to public perception.292 The public cognitively relates
labels to what people know and think of certain words; the public’s
perception is important for social condemnation, which is essential to
substantive criminal law.293
283. See TEMKIN, supra note 42, at 67.
284. See Stuart P. Green & Matthew B. Kugler, Community Perceptions of Theft
Seriousness: A Challenge to Model Penal Code and English Theft Act Consolidation,
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 511, 511 (2010).
285. See C.M.V. Clarkson, Theft and Fair Labeling, 56 MOD. L. REV. 554, 554–55 (1993).
286. See Green & Kugler, supra note 284, at 515–16.
287. See STUART P. GREEN, THIRTEEN WAYS TO STEAL A BICYCLE: THEFT LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 52–54 (2012) (explaining the principle of fair labeling).
288. See Hong, supra note 28, at 269.
289. Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 539,
546 (2000); Hong, supra note 28, at 292 (discussing expressive powers of law); see
also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 391, 397–400 (1997) (portraying the expressive power of law as
equal to its coercive power).
290. See Chiesa, supra note 46, at 419 (noting that “the law often needs to adopt bright line
rules” to clarify “vague moral standards”).
291. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 520–23 (2001) (stressing that the expressive power of legislators is impeded by
the police, the prosecution, and the courts).
292. See GREEN, supra note 28, at 72 (stressing laws should recognize the degrees of
blameworthiness viewed between two or more types of conduct in legal cases).
293. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
401, 404–05 (1958) (reviewing the role of condemnation in criminal law).
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Whenever it is published that a person has been convicted of a
certain crime without any specific details, we can assume that the
public’s perception will cognitively relate it to the social paradigm of
that crime.294 So, if we label offenses regardless of what the public
knows and perceives, we might lose the communicative power of the
offense’s meaning and the related benefits in terms of labeling. An
accurate label is not only fair to perpetrators and victims; it also
sharply clarifies the harms caused by the offense, the dangerousness
of the offenders, and perhaps also possible strategies and tactics for
the public’s protection in accordance with those dangers.295
This general approach also applies to rape.296 Proper labeling
means not only fairness to offenders, but also benefits to the public,
marking the severity and the danger of the offense.297 When looking
at the offline world, the dangers presented by coercive and fraudulent
sex, as well those presented by sexual acts committed with an
incompetent individual, are quite different.298
The danger of coercive rape is ignoring another’s free will with the
preparedness to violate it,299 thus the accurate legal warning is to stay
away from that person, and to avoid physical proximity and contact.
The danger of fraudulent rape is different, using social manipulation
and abuse of trust, and therefore the accurate legal warning should
tell people to be extremely careful when accepting someone’s claims
as truth and in relying on their assertions.300 The danger of statutory
rape is different as well—i.e., sexual attraction to minors301—and the
legal warning would be to keep our children away.
What happens to the above dangers in cyberspace? Physical
consequences like pregnancy and transmitted diseases are
294. See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 473
(1976) (discussing the image of thieves and how that image influenced criminal law).
295. See Clarkson, supra note 285, at 554–55.
296. See Green, supra note 46, at 220 (emphasizing the importance of fair labeling in rape
law).
297. See GREEN, supra note 28, at 72.
298. See infra text accompanying notes 299–301.
299. But see Conaghan, supra note 1, at 175 (pointing to the understanding of the essential
harm of rape as the erasure of women’s subjectivity).
300. See Falk, supra note 179, at 50–51 (stressing that sex by fraud often involves a special
kind of sexual predator who uses the same method against multiple victims,
sometimes strategically, thus separating them from forceful rapists).
301. Attraction between minors is different than attraction between minors and adults, and
attraction by adults to children is very different than attraction by adults to teenagers
nearing adulthood. See PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
ON THE INTERNET 27 (2001) (distinguishing adult attraction to adolescents from adult
attraction to children).
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theoretically impossible.302 Outside the technological scenarios, rape
is when perpetrators and victims are present at the same place at the
same time. Therefore, when we hear someone is a rapist, we might
keep our distance. However, distance provides no shelter on
cyberspace.
On the contrary, distance is the perpetrator’s
specialty.303 Distance is a disinhibiting, effective, and empathy-free
criminal tool.304 This is a different and unique type of sexual danger,
derived from deception, manipulation, or even coercion.305
Indeed, pedophiles who approach children online often use fake
personas and misrepresent themselves, through deception,
manipulation, and sometimes blackmail.306 The verbal rape thesis
suggests a normative difference from that of the physical forms of
rape.307 Distant manipulation always requires a self-inflicted act of
penetration.308
Furthermore, geographical distance between perpetrators and
victims means the absence of possible immediate physical escalation,
a potential danger in fraudulent rape and sometimes in statutory rape
when victims change their mind and cease cooperating.309 No
wonder the verbal rape phenomenon is new even for pedophiles.310
The possibilities of adults to reach children, lie to them about their
age, meet them, win their trust and heart, and finally bring them to
agree to sexual activity, are much more limited offline.311 Those who
succeed in manipulation in the real world are not likely to forego full

302. See Castronova, supra note 125, at 1092–93 (stressing that although technology offers
many sexual options, online fertilization is not amongst them).
303. See Mathis, supra note 266, at 186 (noting that sexual danger to children has moved
from the parks to cyberspace).
304. See Suler, supra note 151, at 322 (noting that an online perpetrator is less inhibited
because of the anonymity in contacting someone at a distance).
305. See infra text accompanying notes 306–14.
306. See Child Sexual Exploitation, FBI (May 10, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories
/threat-from-pedophiles-online-is-vast-and-extensive [https://perma.cc/B6RA-9BRN]
(“The pedophiles tricked their young victims by creating fake profiles on social
networking sites, where they posed as teenagers to lure children to their websites.”).
307. See infra notes 309–14 and accompanying text.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 160–74.
309. See supra notes 238–56 and accompanying text.
310. See Mathis, supra note 266, at 186 (referring to the internet as a “new ‘modern public
square’” that presents novel dangers to children).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 238–52.
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intercourse.312
The dangers of verbal rape entail deception,
manipulation, and coercion, all of which are far from being
insignificant and marginal in nature.313 Nevertheless, they are
usually dealt with under different legal frameworks.314 These
frameworks may be general, outdated offenses. Alternatively, they
may be unique and new. A general framework might be for nonsexual offenses, like fraud and blackmail, or some sort of a sexual
offense, if the language employed is broad and abstract enough.
For example, the rape offense in New Jersey was replaced with a
general offense of sexual assault in 1978, and the term of penetration
was widened to include intercourse, anal sex, oral sex, as well as
inserting fingers or objects into another’s vagina or rectum, either by
the perpetrator or under the perpetrator’s instruction.315 This law was
applied to a verbal rape scenario, regarding someone posing as a
physician who brought a child to engage in self-penetration.316
In California, the general provisions in the penal code include a
scenario in which the perpetrator inserts something to the victim’s
genitalia against their will.317 When the victim is under fourteen,
there is no need to show force or threat.318 One who knowingly
contacts a minor in order to perform such action is also criminally
liable.319 These provisions were used to convict a sixty-year-old
perpetrator who deceived a sixteen-year-old girl into online
communication and later into self-touch.320 There is also a federal
law which covers an interstate persuasion of minors to engage in

312. See Roth, supra note 259, at 1676 (explaining that adolescents are more susceptible to
manipulation and ultimately believing it was their own decision to participate in
sexual conduct).
313. Sparrow & Karas, supra note 167, at 202–03 (stressing the severity of online sexual
deception); see also Manta, supra note 250, at 247 (emphasizing the personal and
collective harm of sexual fraud related to online dating).
314. See Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds,
11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 60–61 (2008) (discussing the lack of a specific legal
framework dealing with virtual crimes).
315. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(c) (West 2020). The word “rape” does not appear in
New Jersey’s criminal code. See id.; see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(5)(b)(1)(a)
(West 2019) (Wisconsin’s sexual assault statute is similar to New Jersey’s).
316. See New Jersey v. Maxwell, 825 A.2d 1224, 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001).
317. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2020).
318. See id. § 289.
319. See id. § 288.3(a).
320. See People v. Shapiro, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 54, 56–57 (2014) (denying constitutional
challenge to California’s statute prohibiting contacting a minor for the purpose of
committing various crimes, including sexual penetration of a minor, and approving
sentence of 240 days’ imprisonment).

2021]

Cyber Rape: Online Violations of Sexual Autonomy

395

prostitution or sexual activity.321 It is not completely clear whether
this law can be applied to online sexual activity.322
Hitherto, no state has formally defined the scenarios thoroughly
examined here as “rape.”323 There are some specific prohibitions that
address such scenarios, at least regarding minors.324 Louisiana has
criminalized “[i]ndecent behavior with juveniles,” including
“[c]omputer-aided solicitation of a minor.”325 Idaho has created a
specific offense of “[e]nticing a child through use of the Internet or
other communication device.”326 Canada has a specific provision
regarding minors, titled “Invitation to sexual touching,” which may
apply to the above described scenarios.327 When the acts involve
dissemination of photographs, they are subject to prohibitions under
child pornography laws.328 Five American states passed laws to
explicitly prohibit sextortion.329
Such special offenses present new terminology, which tells a new
story, helping us to differentiate them from the old traditional and
general offenses.330 The labels of criminal offenses convey legal

321. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (2018).
322. Compare United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012), with United States
v. Taylor, 640 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2011).
323. See Susan W. Brenner, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, in
CYBERCRIME: DIGITAL COPS IN A NETWORKED ENVIRONMENT 207, 208 (Jack M.
Balkin et al., eds., 2006) (arguing that although many types of acts are possible
online, rape is not); see Brenner, supra note 314, at 77; see also Lemley and Volokh,
supra note 125, at 1083 (applying the normative meaning of rape to virtual groping
performed by avatars against other avatars, causing emotional distress to users of
violated avatars).
324. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1590A (West 2020). See generally LA. STAT. ANN. §§
14:81, 14:81.3 (2020).
325. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:81, 14:81.3 (2020); see also Louisiana v. Whitmore, 58 So.
3d 583, 585–87, 590–93, 595–97 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/2/11) (denying constitutional
challenge and affirming defendant’s four-year prison sentence for conversing online
with an undercover police agent and attempting to induce a minor to self-touch).
326. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1590A (West 2020); see also Idaho v. Glass, 190 P.3d 896,
899900, 905 (Idaho 2008) (approving a fifteen-year sentence for defendant who
conversed online with a police agent posing as a child).
327. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 § 152 (Can.).
328. See Mills, supra note 273, at 9 (stressing the broadness of child pornography laws,
which often include peer sexting between teenagers).
329. See Robbins, supra note 220, at 776, 781–84 (reviewing new legislation in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, and Utah).
330. Clay Calvert et al., Playing Legislative Catch-Up in 2010 with a Growing, High-Tech
Phenomenon: Evolving Statutory Approaches for Addressing Teen Sexting, 11 PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2010) (discussing the new phenomenon of sexting); see
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messages to society about the sexual abuse of minors, online or in
general.331 Simultaneously, the labels employed also send the
message that although criminal law will not tolerate such conduct,
the law still sees material differences between certain types of actions
and forms of rape.332 This message might be supplemented by the
law’s message that only minors can be the victims of such offenses,
excluding adults as potential victims. Adults can be the victims of
rape, sexually coerced, and deceived online, but some states have not
created special offenses to protect them in this new offensive
world.333
CONCLUSION
A very familiar saying is that the law always lags behind
technology.334 But it is not only technology that changes, as the law
constantly evolves.335 When society and law enforcement run into
new offensive scenarios, we get the chance to rethink our existing
criminal offenses and societal values. This is a great opportunity to
reflect on important developments in technology and the law.
What is rape? Numerous academic research projects have been
conducted on rape, perhaps more so than on any other offense; yet
sometimes the more we study rape, the less we grasp its normative
essence.336 The cyber rape thesis compels us to deeply reflect once
again upon rape as a criminal offense, inspect its normative
boundaries, and examine if it can take on a digital form. Can rape be
done from afar, through words? One can be deceived, manipulated,
and coerced into self-penetration from a distance.337 Should such
illicit communication be considered rape? The answer illuminates
what rape was, what rape is, and what rape might become in the
future.

331.
332.
333.
334.

335.
336.
337.

also Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct,
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 801–02 (1988) (describing how feminism manifested the
acknowledgement of sexual harassment as a unique legal harm).
See supra notes 323–30 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 323–30.
See supra notes 6–9, 324–31 and accompanying text.
Reidenberg, supra note 17, at 586; see Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of
Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 87, 97 (2001)
(analyzing the problems that outdated laws cause with technological crimes).
See Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1,
15–17 (2009) (observing that the law is constantly changing).
See, e.g., Conaghan, supra note 1, at 177 (concluding that “it is difficult to identify or
defend an ‘essence’ of rape”).
See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
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The new technological world encourages us to embark upon a new
and unfamiliar journey.338 That journey, in turn, obligates us to
sincerely ask ourselves how well we understand the rationales of
criminal offenses, the boundaries between them, and the frontiers of
the criminal realm, realizing how difficult those questions are. Once
we realize the depths of these challenges, we can start working on the
solutions.

338. See supra text accompanying notes 334–37.
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